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     Law Review 
The Federal Right to Recover Fugitive Slaves: 
An Absolute but Self-Defeating Property Right 
Jeffrey M. Schmitt* 
 
Modern property scholarship recognizes that “the key to understanding 
property law” is recognizing that “[p]roperty rights are limited by and exist in 
conjunction with the rights of others.”1 In the antebellum era, slave owners’ 
property rights in fugitive slaves who had escaped into the North existed in 
tension with the rights of free blacks who might be wrongfully claimed. At first, 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 (Act of 1793), as supplemented by the law in most 
Northern states, limited a slave owner’s property rights by providing limited 
legal protections to free blacks against being erroneously claimed as slaves.2 As 
attitudes towards slavery changed, however, state laws in the North became 
increasingly protective of free blacks, and Southerners became less willing to 
accept any limitations on the right to recover fugitive slaves. The Supreme Court 
responded in Prigg v. Pennsylvania by striking down state law limitations on slave 
owners’ ability to recapture fugitive slaves.3 Congress followed suit in the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (Act of 1850) by federalizing a strong property right in 
fugitive slaves that was only marginally limited by the alleged slave’s right to 
freedom.4 This Article argues that the federal government’s one-sided approach 
to the fugitive slave issue, however, generated an antislavery backlash that 
undermined Northern support for the rendition of fugitive slaves, making 
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rendition costly and dangerous. The fugitive slave issue, therefore, suggests that 
property rights that ignore the rights of others are not only unjust, but, in the 
right circumstances, can also be self-defeating.  
This Article proceeds in four sections. Part I discusses the nation’s early 
history on fugitive slave rendition, including the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Act 
of 1793, and state legislation. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania and how this decision changed the preexisting legal 
landscape. Part III details the passage of the Act of 1850 and discusses its 
contents. Part IV discusses Northern reaction to the Fugitive Slave Act. This 
Article ultimately concludes that, although federal policy was meant to provide 
slave owners with virtually absolute property rights in their fugitive slaves, this 
approach was counterproductive due to the lack of consideration given to the 
rights of free blacks in the North. 
I. Early Fugitive Slave Rendition 
Although slavery was a major issue at the Constitutional Convention,5 the 
surviving records contain little discussion on the Fugitive Slave Clause. 
Introduced by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, the Clause was 
adopted with little debate, as part of no constitutional deal, and with no serious 
opposition.6 The framers probably did not debate the Clause at length because 
they either did not anticipate the Clause’s importance or they found it 
uncontroversial due to their common law heritage of rendition.7  
                                                 
5 James Madison famously observed: “The States were divided into different 
interests not by their difference of size, but . . . principally from [the effects of] their 
having or not having slaves.” 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
at 486 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911) (alteration in original). 
6 See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and 
Liberty in the Age of Jefferson, 31-32, 81-83 (1996). The only substantive 
objection given to the Fugitive Slave Clause at the convention was made by James Wilson 
of Pennsylvania, who protested that it would “oblige the Executive of the State to [return 
fugitive slaves], at the public[’s] expen[s]e.” 2 Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, at 443 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911). Moreover, 
the Fugitive Slave Clause was only mentioned in passing by Southern supporters of the 
Constitution. See also 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 83-
85 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911) (North Carolina Delegates to Governor 
Caswell); id. at 252-55 (General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s speech in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives); id. at 324-29 (Debate in the Virginia Convention). 
7 At the time of the Convention, none of the states had legislation freeing runaways, 
and fugitive slaves perhaps only found safety in Massachusetts. Finkelman, supra note 
6, at 82-83. Southerners may have nevertheless found it necessary due to the English 
decision of Somerset, which held the slave law of the colonies had no application in 
England. See Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). Under Somerset, because 
colonial law had no effect in England, a master had no legal authority to hold his slaves. 
H. Robert Baker, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Ambivalent 
Constitution 44 (2012); cf. Earl M. Maltz, Fugitive Slave on Trial: 
The Anthony Burns Case and Abolitionist Outrage 5-6 (2010) (arguing 
that, although the lack of discussion on the Fugitive Slave Clause at the Constitutional 
Convention might seem odd to modern observers, the Clause’s underlying concept was 
not novel at the time). 





The text of the Fugitive Slave Clause is no more revealing than its history. 
In full, the Clause states: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but 
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or 
Labour may be due.8 
While the text clearly prohibited the states from liberating fugitive slaves, its 
meaning is otherwise highly ambiguous. By using the passive voice—“shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party”—the text does not clearly indicate which 
level of government, if any, must “deliver up” the fugitive.9 The Clause 
therefore does not explicitly give legislative power to Congress. The word 
“Claim” also does not clearly convey which procedures, if any, the person 
claiming the fugitive must follow. 
Congress implicitly claimed legislative power under the Clause by passing 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.10 The Act of 1793 authorized a Southern claimant 
“to seize or arrest” a fugitive slave and bring him before a state or federal judge 
or magistrate.11 After proving “to the satisfaction of such Judge or magistrate” 
that the person claimed was a fugitive slave, the claimant would receive a 
certificate authorizing the removal of the fugitive from the state.12 The Act of 
1793, however, did not explicitly require the owner to use such legal procedures 
or provide penalties for false claims.13 
Many state governments also passed legislation designed to supplement the 
provisions of the Act of 1793. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1842 decision in 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,14 such state legislation not only typically provided some 
protections for free blacks against kidnapping, but also offered state assistance 
for slave catchers who complied with state procedures. These early laws 
represented an attempt to balance the property rights of slave owners against the 
liberty of free blacks.15 
Pennsylvania’s legislation provides a good example. In 1820, Pennsylvania 
passed a statute that prohibited aldermen and justices of the peace from hearing 
fugitive slave cases.16 Under pressure from neighboring Maryland, however, 
Pennsylvania enacted a compromise statute in 1826.17 This statute required a 
Southern claimant to apply to any judge, justice of the peace, or alderman for a 
                                                 
8 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
9 Id. 
10 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 9 Stat. 462 (amended 1850). 
11 Id. at § 3. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 41 U.S. 539 (1841). 
15 See H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 
Law & Hist. Rev. 1133, 1134-35 (2012). 
16 Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws 
of the North: 1780-1861, at 45 (1974). 
17 Id. at 46, 51. 





warrant for the arrest of a fugitive.18 After the arrest, the judge would issue a 
certificate of removal if he was satisfied that the person claimed owed service.19 
The 1826 law therefore provided state assistance in the reclamation of fugitive 
slaves. However, it also provided protection to free blacks by requiring claimants 
to obtain a certificate of removal from a state or federal officer before removing 
an alleged fugitive and by requiring the claimant to produce more evidence than 
merely his own affidavit.20 The law’s sponsor advocated it as a compromise 
measure, and a commissioner from Maryland who had been sent to advocate for 
changes to the 1820 law praised the new legislation “because it is a pledge, that 
the states will adhere to their original obligations of the confederacy.”21 
Other Northern states followed suit. In 1828, New York passed a law that 
established procedures for Southern claimants and state officers.22 While the 
New York law provided more protections for free blacks, including the 
possibility of a jury trial, it represented a voluntary state effort to participate in 
fugitive slave rendition under terms acceptable to the state.23 Ohio passed a 
similar law in response to pressure from Kentucky in 1839, though Ohio did not 
require a trial by jury.24 Even in states without formal legislation, states often 
supplemented the Act of 1793 with state common law procedures such as habeas 
corpus.25 
These state procedures operated in concert with the Act of 1793. Whereas 
federal law governed the rendition of fugitive slaves, state law punished unlawful 
kidnapping of black residents.26 As historian H. Robert Baker argues, the 
distinction between fugitive rendition and protection from kidnapping “was 
artificial, but it worked.”27 The distinction was artificial because both regimes 
involved an initial determination of whether the claimed individual was in fact a 
fugitive slave.28 The system worked, however, because both regimes were 
enforced by state judges and magistrates. In a typical case, the state judge could 
use state procedures to determine if the claimed individual was a fugitive slave, 
and, if appropriate, use federal procedures to remand the fugitive to the South.29  
                                                 
18 Id. at 51-52. 
19 Id. at 52. 
20 Morris, supra note 16, at 51-52. 
21 Id. at 52-53 (quoting Letter from Robert H. Goldsborough to W.M. Meredith 
(Mar. 29, 1826), Meredith Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). 
22 Id. at 53. 
23 Id. at 53, 55-57. Indiana passed similar laws in 1816 and 1824. See Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the 
United States Government’s Relations to Slavery 216 (2002).  
24 Ohio had passed a separate anti-kidnapping law in 1819 that required slave 
catchers to comply with the procedures established in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. See 
Fehrenbacher, supra note 23, at 215.  
25 Baker, supra note 15, at 1145-46. 
26 Baker, supra note 7, at 54, 63. 
27 See id. at 63. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 





Although this overlapping system of state and federal law successfully 
prevented any major sectional confrontation on the issue of fugitive slaves, other 
forces increasingly radicalized national opinion on slavery during the 1830s. 
Among other things, this decade saw the rise of the abolitionist movement, the 
gag rule controversy in Congress, Nat Turner’s bloody slave revolt, and South 
Carolina’s nullification controversy. As a result, sectional opinion on the fugitive 
slave issue became more polarized, as Northerners were increasingly insistent on 
state measures designed to protect free blacks and Southerners were less willing 
to tolerate any interference with fugitive rendition.30  
Nevertheless, the system of overlapping federal and state law prevailed into 
the 1840s. State and federal courts generally upheld the use of both state and 
federal procedures.31 While attempts were made in states such as Pennsylvania 
and New York to repeal or drastically amend state fugitive slave legislation, 
moderate Northerners blocked such proposals out of a desire to accommodate 
the South.32 Moreover, the Ohio act, passed in 1839, demonstrated that the 
cooperative system of state and federal legislation, though strained, remained 
viable even in the context of rising sectional tension.33  
II.  Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
Rising sectional opinion on slavery, however, helped to turn a Pennsylvania 
kidnapping prosecution into a test case for the constitutionality of the country’s 
fugitive slave regime. In 1837, Edward Prigg, a Maryland slave catcher, entered 
Pennsylvania and applied for a warrant for the arrest of Margaret Morgan and 
her children as fugitive slaves.34 Acting under Pennsylvania’s 1826 law, a state 
                                                 
30 See Morris, supra note 16, at 59-93. 
31 See Baker, supra note 15, at 1148-56. Several cases explicitly declared the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1793 constitutional, though they provided little or no analysis. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 851 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833); Commonwealth v. 
Griffith, 19 Mass. 11 (1823); Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawl 62 (Pa. 1819); In re Susan, 
23 F. Cas. 444 (C.C.D. Ind. 1818). A number of cases also upheld state court use of the 
writ of habeas corpus to determine the status of individuals claimed as fugitive slaves. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. 11, 21 (1823) (asserting that “a habeas corpus 
would lie to obtain the release of the person seized” under the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1793); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 2 Serg. & Rawl 305 (Pa. 1816) (examining the status 
of a person claimed under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 under a writ of habeas corpus). 
Those few state judges who found elements of the preexisting system unconstitutional 
reached profoundly different conclusions. Compare Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311, 321 
(N.Y. 1834) (holding that Congress’s power to legislate was exclusive and that the 
Fugitive Slave Clause “prohibits the states from legislating upon the question involving 
the owner's right to this species of labor”) with Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 506, 524 (1835) 
(Chancellor Walworth, concurring) (stating that that the Fugitive Slave Clause granted 
no power to Congress and that the states could require legal proceedings such as habeas 
corpus hearings to determine if a person claimed was in fact a fugitive slave). 
32 Morris, supra note 16, at 92-93. 
33 See Baker, supra note 7, at 63; Steven Lubet, Fugitive Justice: 
Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial 29-30 (2010).  
34 Baker, supra note 7, at 108. Although Morgan was never formally manumitted, 
she had lived her life in relative freedom and had never been claimed as a slave. Id. at 102-
03. In fact, she had openly lived with her free husband in Pennsylvania for about five 





justice of the peace issued a warrant, and a state constable arrested Morgan and 
her children.35 The 1826 law required Prigg to then bring Morgan before a court 
of record, which could issue a certificate of removal.36 Rather than complying 
with this procedure, however, Prigg spirited Morgan and her children back to 
Maryland without further legal process.37 Once in Maryland, Morgan brought a 
suit for her freedom, but a Maryland jury found that she was a slave under 
Maryland law.38  
Soon thereafter, Pennsylvania indicted Edward Prigg for removing Morgan, 
without first obtaining a certificate of removal, as required under the State’s 
personal liberty law.39 When the Governor of Pennsylvania demanded the 
extradition of Prigg, Maryland negotiated for his surrender as part of a challenge 
to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s 1826 law.40 In this agreement, the 
parties stipulated to a set of facts that were entered into the record as a special 
verdict.41 Among other things, the parties agreed to the following: Margaret 
Morgan was a fugitive slave; Edward Prigg was the legal agent of Morgan’s 
owner; and Prigg had removed Morgan and her children without a certificate of 
removal.42 Based on these facts, the Pennsylvania courts convicted Prigg, and a 
writ of error was taken to the United States Supreme Court.43 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania fundamentally 
altered the preexisting framework for the rendition of fugitive slaves. In an 
opinion authored by Justice Joseph Story, the Court began its analysis by holding 
that the Fugitive Slave Clause created a private right of recaption, which gave a 
slave owner “entire authority, in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture 
his slave, whenever he can do it.”44 According to Story, however, this private 
right of recaption would be meaningless without supporting legislation to 
overcome public and local governmental resistance.45 The Clause’s grant of 
legislative power therefore derived from Story’s practical judgment that private 
recaption would be impractical without it. 
                                                                                                             
years. When Morgan’s parents’ master died, however, the master’s heir sought to claim 
Morgan as a fugitive slave. Id. at 103-04. 
35 Id. at 108. 
36 Id. 
37 Baker speculates that Edward Prigg may have worried that Margaret Morgan’s 
husband would raise abolitionist resistance or mount a legal defense. Id. at 109. 
38 Id. at 109-10. 
39 Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and 
Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 247, 252 (1994). 
40 Baker, supra note 15, at 1156. 
41 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 557-58. 
42 Id. 556-57. 
43 Id. at 558. 
44 Id. at 613. 
45 Justice Story explained: “Many cases must arise, in which, if the remedy of the 
owner were confined to the mere right of seizure and recaption, he would be utterly 
without any adequate redress. He may not be able to lay his hands upon the slave. He may 
not be able to enforce his rights against persons, who either secrete or conceal, or 
withhold the slave. He may be restricted by local legislation . . . .” Id. at 613-14. 





Story further found that the legislation required by the Clause must be 
federal.46 Although he acknowledged that the Clause explicitly conferred no 
legislative power on Congress, he made a functionalist argument for implying 
such a power.47 Story started from the following premise: “[W]here the end is 
required, the means are given; and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to 
perform it, is contemplated to exist . . . .”48 Here, the “end” was the rendition of 
a fugitive after a master’s claim to ownership, and the “duty” was to ensure that 
such rendition took place. Story held that the Fugitive Slave Clause granted 
legislative power to Congress because such power was necessary to ensure the 
return of fugitive slaves.49  
Although Justice Story failed to acknowledge as much, his argument for 
implied federal power assumed that state legislation would be inadequate. 
Simply put, if state legislation could effectively achieve the “end” of the Clause, 
there would be no necessity to justify implied federal power. Moreover, Story 
feared that private recaption “may be restricted by local legislation,” indicating 
that he had little confidence in the states’ desire to aid in rendition.50 
Story not only held that Congress had power to legislate, but he also held 
that the states were prohibited from doing so.51 According to Story, “the power 
of legislation upon this subject is exclusive in the national government.”52 This 
holding is similarly based on an assumption that the states would not faithfully 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause. 53 Justice Story explained that the issue of 
whether Congress’s power should be seen as exclusive required consideration of 
“the nature of the power, and the true objects to be attained by it.”54 According 
to Justice Story, exclusivity was necessary because state legislative power would 
“amount to a power to destroy the rights of the owner.”55 State legislation, he 
feared, would undermine the rendition process.56 
                                                 
46 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 541-42. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 541. 
49 Id. at 604. 
50 Id. at 614.  
51 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 542. 
52 Id. at 622. 
53 Although Justice Story asserted that the Fugitive Slave Clause’s presence in the 
Federal Constitution implied that the federal government had an exclusive duty to 
enforce it, this assertion cannot justify his holding. Story’s argument appears to be 
circular, as the Fugitive Slave Clause just as easily could be seen as imposing a duty on the 
states. As Chief Justice Taney argued in his concurring opinion, the Constitution grants 
many federal rights, which may be protected by both levels of government. Prigg, 41 U.S. 
at 628-29. For example, Taney explained that the Contract Clause’s presence in the 
Constitution does not imply that the states are prohibited from passing legislation to 
enforce contracts. Taney asserted: “I cannot understand the rule of construction by 
which a positive and express stipulation for the security of certain individual rights of 
property in the several states, is held to imply a prohibition to the states to pass any laws 
to guard and protect them.” Id. at 629.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 624. 
56 Justices Wayne and McLean made similar arguments. See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 612. 





Story further held that the states could not interfere with fugitive rendition 
through the guise of anti-kidnapping legislation passed under the state’s police 
powers.57 He stated that “any state law or state regulation, which interrupts, 
limits, delays or postpones the right of the owner to the immediate possession of 
the slave” would violate the owner’s constitutional right to private recaption.58 
This was so, Story asserted, because the right of recaption was an “unqualified 
right . . . , which no state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, 
control or restrain.”59 Story therefore implicitly invalidated all state personal 
liberty laws designed to give some legal process to individuals claimed as fugitive 
slaves.  
In a precursor to the modern anti-commandeering doctrine, the Court also 
indicated in dictum that Congress could not require state officers to enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Justice Story stated that the Act of 1793 was “clearly 
constitutional, in all its leading provisions, . . . with the exception of that part 
which confers authority upon state magistrates.”60 He further stated that “a 
difference of opinion” existed as to “whether state magistrates are bound to act 
under it.”61 Story thus not only found that Congress had exclusive power to 
legislate, but he further indicated that federal officers must have primary 
responsibility for enforcement. 
Given these doctrines, the Court had no trouble finding that Pennsylvania’s 
law was unconstitutional, resulting in a reversal of the judgment against Edward 
Prigg. Because the jury had found that Margaret Morgan was a fugitive slave, 
Pennsylvania could not punish Prigg for reclaiming her.62 
III. Nullification of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 
Prigg helped bring about nullification of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 by 
undermining Northern cooperation in fugitive slave rendition. Because few 
federal officers were available in the states, Southern claimants were usually on 
their own if they were unable to obtain state assistance.63 Although slave catchers 
sometimes utilized the private right of recaption, local sympathies often made 
recovery impractical.64 Without state cooperation, the Act of 1793 was virtually a 
dead letter.  
                                                 
57 Id. at 588. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 540. 
60 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622. 
61 Story asserted, however, that the justices agreed that “state magistrates may, if 
they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.” Id. 
62 Aside from a brief mention in his statement of the facts, Story makes no mention 
of Morgan’s daughter, who was born in Pennsylvania. Id. at 608-09. 
63 Paul Finkelman, The Appeasement of 1850, in Congress and the Crisis 
of the 1850s 69 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2012). 
64 See Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of 
a Proslavery Decision, 25 Civil War History 5 (1979). In one famous case, for 
example, George Latimer was seized as a fugitive slave in Boston. When his owner was 
denied the use of the local jail, however, public opposition forced him to sell Latimer to 
local abolitionists. See id. at 23. 





Prigg contributed to Northern noncooperation in at least three ways. First, 
the decision declared Pennsylvania’s 1826 law unconstitutional and implicitly 
invalidated similar compromise legislation throughout the North. After Prigg, 
claimants could no longer take advantage of legislation in states such as 
Pennsylvania and New York that offered state assistance in the recovery of 
fugitive slaves.65 
Second, Northern state courts used Prigg’s anti-commandeering principle to 
avoid hearing cases under the Act of 1793.66 Although Justice Story had merely 
suggested that Congress could not require state officers to enforce the Act, 
antislavery lawyers and state judges often distorted this doctrine to claim that 
state officers lacked the power to hear fugitive cases.67 As Paul Finkelman has 
demonstrated: “State judges were able to declare that they had no authority to 
hear cases involving fugitives, and to suggest claimants ought to seek a remedy in 
a federal court. Such a court might be hundreds of miles away and perhaps not 
even in session.”68 For all practical purposes, the Act of 1793 was often therefore 
rendered a nullity. 
Without the precedent of Prigg, it is unlikely that most of these state judges 
would have refused to hear these cases or otherwise would have reached an 
antislavery result. In Justice Accused, Robert Cover explains that antislavery 
judges felt constrained to follow the dictates of the positive law, even when such 
law conflicted with their views of morality.69 These judges justified their role in 
government by claiming that formal legal principles limited judicial discretion. 
These judges therefore rejected any theory that allowed judges to impose their 
personal beliefs on the nation.70 In fact, prior to Prigg, antislavery judges 
generally did not declare that the Act of 1793 was invalid because it was immoral; 
instead, they found that it conflicted with the Constitution.71 After Prigg held 
that the Act of 1793 was constitutional, antislavery judges could not realistically 
disagree while remaining faithful to their judicial role. If Prigg had ended there, 
antislavery judges may have had no option but to enforce the law. Prigg’s anti-
commandeering principle, however, gave antislavery judges a way out—they 
could reach an antislavery result while still complying with the positive law by 
refusing to take jurisdiction in fugitive cases.72  
Prigg resulted in nullification of the Act of 1793 for a third reason as well: it 
contributed to the passage of the North’s personal liberty laws.73 These laws 
                                                 
65 Although the Court later ruled that states could pass legislation aiding fugitive 
claimants in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 (1852), compromise legislation meant to 
provide procedural protections for free blacks remained unconstitutional under Prigg. 
Consequently, most Northern states did not pass such legislation. 
66 Finkelman, supra note 63, at 22. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the 
Judicial Process (1975). 
70 Id. 
71 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
72 See Finkelman, supra note 64, at 23-25. 
73 Id. at 21. 





codified noncooperation by barring state judges and law enforcement officers 
from assisting in rendition and by prohibiting the use of state jails to hold 
fugitives. In the six years following Prigg, six Northern states passed such laws.74  
The personal liberty laws reflected growing opposition to slavery in the 
North. As explained above, sectional hostility was on the rise in the early 1840s 
for a number of reasons, including sectional controversies over the gag rule in 
Congress and the annexation of Texas.75 Prigg’s direct contribution to the 
antislavery movement paled in comparison to larger national events.76 
Nevertheless, Prigg played a major role in channeling this rising antislavery 
feeling into support for the personal liberty laws. Just as antislavery judges felt 
that their judicial role forced them to follow the positive law, most mainstream 
politicians argued that any antislavery impulse must be tempered by strict 
adherence to the Constitution. 77  When Charles Francis Adams wrote a 
committee report on Massachusetts’ proposed personal liberty law, he 
acknowledged that the constitutional duty to return fugitive slaves could not be 
violated because “forms of law, legal precedents, and constitutional 
arrangements” mattered.78 Like with Northern judges, however, Prigg gave state 
legislatures a way to nullify the Act of 1793 while still remaining faithful to the 
Constitution. Under Prigg’s anti-commandeering and federal exclusivity 
principles, it was constitutional for a state to refuse to take part in fugitive slave 
rendition. Prigg therefore legitimized the personal liberty laws in the eyes of 
many Northerners who would never have approved of nullification. Although 
Prigg did not directly create significant sectional hostility to slavery, the decision 
played an important role in the creation of the personal liberty laws by directing 
the antislavery impulse of the North into noncooperation on fugitive slaves.  
Although Prigg announced a strong right on behalf of slave owners to 
recover fugitive slaves without state interference, in practice the Court’s 
decision only made it more difficult for owners to recover their property. Many 
Northerners refused to participate after the Court prohibited them from 
ensuring that rendition followed a fair process that respected the rights of local 
residents. Because most Southern claimants needed support from local 
populations and authorities in the North, noncooperation made rendition costly, 
dangerous, and often impractical. 
                                                 
74 Finkelman, supra note 64, at 21. Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island all passed legislation prohibiting state 
officials from assisting federal rendition. Moreover, Ohio repealed an act that had 
required state officials to do so. After the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was passed, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Maine, and the Minnesota Territory also passed such legislation. Id. 
75 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists 
at Bay 1776-1854, at 350-53 (1990). 
76 Although Prigg drew the scorn of abolitionists, most Northerners were not 
troubled by the decision. Morris, supra note 16, at 104-05. 
77 Id. at 112-13. 
78 Id. at 113. 





IV. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
Northern nullification of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 outraged 
Southerners and provided a strong impetus for a new federal law. In Virginia, for 
example, a legislative committee called the personal liberty laws a “disgusting 
and revolting exhibition of faithless and unconstitutional legislation.”79 In 1850, 
Senator James M. Mason of Virginia exclaimed that “you may as well go down 
into the sea, and endeavor to recover from his native element a fish which had 
escaped from you.”80 Henry Clay asserted that, because “the existing laws for 
the recovery of fugitive slaves . . . [are] inadequate and ineffective, it is 
incumbent of Congress . . . to make the laws more effective.”81  
In 1850, unique political circumstances gave Southerners the opportunity to 
draft a new federal fugitive law. In the late 1840s, the United States waged a 
highly successful war against Mexico, raising the question of what to do with the 
territory acquired from the war. The issue became sectionalized when David 
Wilmot of Pennsylvania, in his famous “Wilmot Proviso,” moved that slavery be 
banned from all newly acquired lands. This proviso, which gained mainstream 
Northern support and even passed the House, unified the South in opposition. 
The proviso was seen as “an insult to the South” and an official condemnation 
of Southern institutions as morally undeserving.82 Southerners worried that if 
the national government could use moral condemnation of slavery to contain 
slaveholders in the South, they could use the same justifications to attack slavery 
itself once expansion had increased Northern political power.83 Before Congress 
convened in 1850, Southern editorials, mass meetings, and congressmen all 
warned of the possibility of disunion if the sectional issues were not resolved.84 
In what became the Compromise of 1850, Whig Senator Henry Clay 
proposed a sweeping plan to resolve all sectional issues. 85  The territorial 
concerns were addressed by admitting California as a Free State and by 
establishing territorial governments in the rest of the Mexican Cession without 
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mentioning the status of slavery.86 Since Southern California was seen as the 
only area hospitable to slavery, this proposal was perceived as a concession to the 
North.87 Although the South had avoided the humiliation of the Wilmot Proviso, 
Northern moderates understood that a Southern victory on the Fugitive Slave 
Act was needed both to induce Southern moderates to accept the Compromise 
and to undermine the position of Southern disunionists.88 The South was thus 
essentially permitted to draft a bill of its own choosing.89 
Senator James Mason of Virginia introduced a strongly proslavery bill on 
January 3, 1850, which was designed to empower the federal government to 
return fugitive slaves even when the Northern states refused to cooperate. New 
York Senator William H. Seward, a well-known antislavery leader, first proposed 
an amendment that would guarantee a jury trial in the state in which the fugitive 
was claimed and require judges to issue writs of habeas corpus when asked to 
inquire into the status of an alleged fugitive.90 Connecticut Senator Roger 
Sherman Baldwin explained that the amendment was needed to protect “the 
liberty of an individual who has a right to remain where he is, and to assert his 
freedom in the State where he happens to be.”91 Southerners opposed the 
amendment, however, out of fear that Northern juries would nullify the law and 
that jury trials would increase the expense of rendition.92 The issue was then 
given to a committee to resolve the sectional disagreement. 
The committee proposed requiring a jury trial after rendition in the 
Southern state from which the fugitive had fled. As Senator Clay told his 
Southern colleagues, guaranteeing a trial in the state from which the fugitive fled 
was a compromise because “[t]he trial by jury is what is demanded by the non-
slaveholding States.”93 Senator Solomon W. Downs of Louisiana, for example, 
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asserted that, because Southern states already provided jury trials to slaves that 
claimed their freedom, if the South rejected the proposal, “our northern friends 
will say that nothing reasonable will satisfy us.”94 These senators recognized that 
offering some concessions to the North may have actually made the law more 
effective by making it more acceptable to the Northern public. 
The jury trial amendment, however, failed due in large part to opposition 
from Southern extremists who wanted the Act to provide owners with an 
absolute right to reclaim their fugitive slaves without any limitations based on the 
competing rights of free blacks in the North.95 Senator Pierre Soule of Louisiana, 
for example, attacked the jury amendment on the grounds that it would “greatly 
embarrass, delay, and add to the expenses of reclamation.”96 Similarly, Senator 
James Mason of Virginia opposed the amendment on the grounds that it would 
infringe on the owner’s right to sell a runaway without delay.97 
Maryland Senator Thomas G. Pratt next offered an amendment to 
indemnify slave owners when the federal government failed to return a claimed 
fugitive slave. Pratt argued that, due to Northern hostility, his amendment was 
“the only means in the power of the Government by which the [Fugitive Slave 
Clause] . . . can be executed.”98 He also argued that, since Northerners would 
not be forced to violate their consciences and slave owners would be 
compensated, his amendment would “settle now and forever the agitation upon 
the subject of fugitive slaves.”99 Pratt’s amendment gained the support of every 
Border State senator, as well as a few senators from the Deep South who were 
strongly supportive of the Compromise of 1850.100  
The indemnification amendment, however, failed to pass due to opposition 
from most Southern senators outside of the Border States. Raising constitutional 
concerns, Senator Davis asked: “If we admit that the Federal Government has 
power to assume control over slave property . . . where shall we find an end to 
the action which antislavery feeling will suggest?”101 Moreover, Senator John M. 
Berrien of Georgia, among others, argued at length that the Constitution 
authorized Congress only to provide for the return of fugitive slaves, and that 
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compensation was beyond its enumerated powers.102 Finally, Senator Hopkins L. 
Turney of Tennessee asserted that the amendment was “neither more nor less 
than a scheme of emancipation, the effect of which will be to emancipate the 
slaves of the Border States and to have them paid for out of the Treasury of the 
United States.”103 Although the amendment would have provided an effective 
remedy to slave owners, these Southerners worried that it would set a precedent 
for federal interference with all property rights in slaves. 
In sum, Southern extremists struck down all attempts to make the Act more 
acceptable to the North or appealing to the Border States. They rejected the jury 
trial amendment because they believed it conflicted with the absolute right of 
recapture. They also rejected a practical remedy in the indemnification 
amendment because of fear that the amendment could undermine the right of 
property in slaves. Southern congressmen designed the Act to represent a strong 
statement of Southern rights rather than a watered-down compromise.104 
After the rejection of each moderating amendment, the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850 emerged from the debates as an uncompromisingly proslavery law that 
both accommodated Prigg’s “unqualified” private right of recaption and 
provided federal procedures that gave little respect to any alleged fugitive’s 
liberty rights.105 The Act of 1850 authorized the owner or his agent to seize and 
remove an alleged fugitive without any legal process.106 Alternatively, the owner 
could enlist the aid of federal authorities.107 Using these procedures, the owner 
first obtained a certificate of removal from a Southern judge before following the 
fugitive to the North.108 This certificate was then presented to a federal judge or 
commissioner in the North who issued a warrant for the fugitive’s arrest.109 
Harsh penalties were given to a federal officer who refused to aid in the 
recapture of a fugitive or who allowed a fugitive placed in his custody to 
escape.110 Moreover, under the possee comitas provision, ordinary Northern 
citizens could be compelled to aid the marshals in securing fugitives.111 Once 
arrested, the alleged fugitive slave had “summary” proceedings before a federal 
commissioner with no opportunity for appeal.112 In these proceedings, the 
commissioner was to determine only if the alleged fugitive was the person 
mentioned in the certificate of removal, because the certificate constituted 
conclusive evidence that the person mentioned therein was a slave.113 The 
commissioner was paid five dollars if the alleged fugitive was found to be free 
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and ten dollars if found to be a slave.114 Under no circumstances was the 
testimony of the alleged fugitive to be admitted.115  
Just as the Supreme Court had recognized an unqualified private right of 
recaption in Prigg, Congress designed the Act of 1850 to create an absolute 
property right in fugitive slaves. According to prominent historian Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, the Act of 1850 was “utterly one-sided, lending categorical 
federal protection to slavery while making no concession to the humanity of 
African-Americans or to the humanitarian sensibilities of many white 
Americans.”116  
V. Northern Reaction to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
Despite its strongly proslavery content, most Northerners initially accepted 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as necessary to appease the South and avoid 
sectional conflict.117 In Congress, moderates allowed the Act of 1850 to pass 
because they understood that a Southern victory on fugitive slaves was needed to 
appease extremists. Daniel Webster, for example, argued that support for the 
Act of 1850 would “rebuk[e] that spirit of faction and disunion” that imperiled 
the country.118 Thirty-one Northern congressmen ultimately voted for the Act of 
1850, while thirty-two abstained and seventy-six voted against it.119 The Act 
passed because of unanimous Southern support.120 After its passage, both major 
political parties in the South endorsed the Georgia Platform, which pledged to 
“abide by [the Compromise of 1850] as a permanent adjustment of this sectional 
controversy” and warned that “upon a faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave 
Law by the proper authorities depends the preservation of our much beloved 
Union.” 121  Because of fear of disunion, Northern politicians, clergy, and 
businessmen all urged the people to accept the law.122 
Acceptance of the Act of 1850, however, was not universal. After its 
passage, the Act was condemned in mass meetings and editorials throughout the 
North.123 Abolitionists formed the core of this opposition. Theodore Parker, for 
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example, pledged “to rescue any fugitive slave from the hands of any officer who 
attempts to return him to bondage.”124 William Lloyd Garrison’s abolitionist 
newspaper, The Liberator, declared: “[W]e rejoice to learn that there is a very 
strong and almost universal expression of detestation of the Fugitive Bill on the 
part of our citizens [in Boston], many of whom openly avow their readiness and 
fixed purpose to prevent its operation here, even though blood should flow like 
water.”125 Ralph Waldo Emerson asserted: “As long as men have bowels, they 
will disobey.”126 Frederick Douglass predicted that, if the people would “make a 
dozen or more dead kidnappers,” the South would lose interest in enforcing the 
law.127 Finally, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner declared: “Let this public 
opinion be felt in its might, and the Fugitive Slave bill will become everywhere 
among us a dead letter.”128  
Although most Northerners did not initially share this abolitionist 
sentiment, enforcement of the harsh and one-sided terms of the Act of 1850 
helped to mobilize opposition to it and slavery throughout the 1850s. Fugitive 
slaves who were seized in Northern cities put a human face on the slavery issue 
in a way that disputes over far-off territories never could.129 Northerners who 
were initially willing to accept the Act of 1850 in the abstract were therefore 
persuaded to change their minds when they personally witnessed courageous 
fugitives fighting for—and often losing—their freedom. As Northern opinion 
turned against the Act of 1850, enforcement of the Act became increasingly 
difficult. 
A. Enforcement of the Act in Boston 
The history of fugitive slave rendition in Boston, the center of the 
abolitionist movement, illustrates this pattern of initial acceptance of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, federal enforcement, and antislavery backlash. Prior 
to the Act’s enforcement, a number of rallies were held to convince the public 
that enforcement was necessary.130 In November of 1850, for example, future 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis warned a large audience at Faneuil Hall 
that, if the Act of 1850 were not enforced, “the end [is] that the government 
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must be destroyed.”131 He further explained that “without an obligation to 
restore fugitives from service, Constitution or no Constitution, Union or no 
Union, we could not expect to live in peace with the slave-holding States.”132 
Even abolitionist leaders lamented that public opinion in Boston supported 
enforcement in 1850.133 
When Bostonians were forced to watch as actual fugitives were torn from 
their lives and forced to return to slavery, however, many decided to ignore 
Justice Curtis’s warnings. One of the most dramatic cases arose just months 
after the passage of the Act of 1850 when U.S. marshals arrested Shadrach 
Minkins as a fugitive slave.134 Shadrach had been working in Boston as a waiter 
for about three months prior to his arrest.135 His case caused a stir in Boston, and 
the initial hearing drew an audience that crowded the courthouse.136 Because the 
Massachusetts personal liberty law forbid the use of State jail to hold a person 
claimed as a fugitive slave, about ten U.S. marshals stood guard over Shadrach in 
the courthouse while antislavery lawyers prepared his defense.137 The marshals, 
however, were overpowered when a group of about twenty free blacks forced the 
courthouse doors open and sent Shadrach on his way to Canada.138  
Following the rescue, President Millard Fillmore issued a proclamation in 
which he promised that he would “see that the laws shall be faithfully executed, 
and all forcible opposition to them suppressed.”139 The Fillmore Administration 
sought to make an example of Shadrach’s rescuers, and nine individuals were 
charged with violating the Act of 1850.140 At this time, most Bostonians backed 
the President and condemned the rescue.141  
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Rather than deter future resistance, however, the trials of Shadrach’s 
rescuers gave antislavery lawyers a public stage from which to attack slavery and 
the legitimacy of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. In the trial of one of Shadrach’s 
alleged rescuers, for example, John Parker Hale, a prominent antislavery leader 
and United States Senator from New Hampshire, told the jury that slavery 
“comes into your Court House today, with a brazen face, and asks you to declare 
that a human being is a slave.”142 In doing so, Hale declared, the Government’s 
case rested on the testimony of a man whose “business is catching and whipping 
negroes” and who is not “very scrupulous how he gets them.” 143  Hale 
continued: “The Government asks you to give up one of your citizens, because 
such a man says he is a slave.”144 When the crowd in the courtroom reacted, the 
marshal ordered silence, and Hale responded: “Yes! silence in the Court! 
Silence the beating of your hearts when you hear such things.”145 In the end, 
Morris was acquitted, and each of the other prosecutions related to Shadrach’s 
rescue resulted in acquittal or a hung jury.146 Enforcement of the Act of 1850 did 
not deter violations; instead, it gave antislavery leaders an opportunity to recruit 
support to their cause. 
In early April of 1851, less than two months after the Shadrach rescue, 
Thomas Sims was arrested under the Act of 1850 in Boston.147 Like Shadrach, 
Sims was held in the Boston courthouse. This time, however, the courthouse 
was barricaded by ropes and chains, the entire Boston police force, reinforced by 
three military companies, patrolled the scene, and two hundred and fifty U.S. 
troops were kept on alert nearby.148 With rescue impractical, Sims’ attorneys 
mounted an exhaustive attack against the constitutionality of the Act of 1850.149 
When the legal challenge proved unsuccessful, antislavery leaders called a 
meeting where the Act of 1850 and its enforcement were denounced in the 
harshest of terms, but the abolitionists took no further action.150 Sims was 
ultimately escorted to a ship in Boston harbor by three hundred armed guards, 
and Sims was ultimately returned to a life of slavery in Georgia. 151 
Although the law was successfully enforced with the backing of Boston 
officials and much of the public, the affair likely helped draw support to the 
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antislavery cause. The Boston Mercantile Journal, for example, though praising 
the rendition, explained that it forced the people to choose between following 
the Constitution and “their feelings of humanity.”152 Echoing a common feeling 
amongst supporters of the law, the paper further stated that “we cannot but 
remark that pity for the fugitive who is returned to thralldom.”153 Moreover, the 
Boston Commonwealth predicted that Sims’ rendition would “prove a disastrous 
triumph to the Slave Power, and mightily serve to augment and extend that 
popular agitation which alone is destined to effect the utter overthrow of the 
slave system.”154 
Perhaps the most famous fugitive slave case is that of Anthony Burns, who 
was arrested in Boston in 1854.155 After learning of Burns’ arrest, antislavery 
leaders called a mass meeting at Faneuil Hall. One printed appeal for the 
meeting called on Bostonians to help a man “awaiting the mockery of a trial 
which shall doom him to all the unutterable misery, horror, and blackness of 
darkness faintly shadowed beneath the word—SLAVERY!—without once 
allowing him to see the face of a judge [or] the face of a jury.”156 Thousands of 
Bostonians attended the meeting where famous abolitionists such as Wendell 
Philips and Theodore Parker denounced the Act of 1850.157  
Parker, for example, addressed the crowd as “[f]ellow subjects of Virginia” 
and said that, through the Act of 1850, slavery “reaches its arm over the graves 
of our mothers, and it kidnaps men in the city of the Puritans, over the graves of 
Samuel Adams and John Hancock.”158 He continued: “Slavery tramples on the 
Constitution; it treads down State rights . . . Where is the trial by jury? . . . 
Where is the sacred right of habeas corpus?”159 The answer, Parker asserted, was 
that the federal officer “can crush [these rights] in his hands, and Boston does 
not say anything against it.”160 Although Parker tried to steer the crowd from 
immediate action, a large crowd from the meeting assaulted the courthouse in an 
unsuccessful attempt to rescue Burns.161 While attempting to enter, several 
hundred protestors knocked down the door with a battering ram, and a U.S. 
Deputy Marshal was fatally stabbed in the ensuing conflict.162  
                                                 
152 Refuge of Oppression. The Slave Case, The Liberator (Apr. 25, 1851) (quoting 
the Boston Mercantile Journal). 
153 Id. 
154 The Fugitive Slave Law, The Liberator (April 18, 1851) (quoting the 
Commonwealth). 
155 See, Maltz, supra note 7; Albert J. Von Frank, The Trials of 
Anthony Burns (1998).  
156 Maltz, supra note 7, at 62 (quoting Anthony Burns, Boston Slave 
Riot, and Trial of Anthony Burns 22 (1854)). 
157 See Von Frank, supra note 155, at 55-59.  
158 Charles Emery Stevens, Anthony Burns: A History 289-90 
(1856). 
159 Id. at 291-92. 
160 See Stephens, supra, note 158, at 292. 
161 See Gordon, supra note 140, at 12-13. 
162 Id. at 62-71. 





To prevent further violence, the Mayor of Boston called out two companies 
of the State Militia, and the U.S. Marshal summoned two companies of 
Marines.163  When Burns finally received his hearing, hundreds of military 
personnel stood guard at the courthouse, forcing a crowd of protestors 
numbering in the thousands to stay in a nearby town square.164 At the hearing, 
Burns’ attorneys sharply criticized slavery, the Act of 1850, and the City’s 
participation in slave catching.165 
After the conclusion of arguments in the removal hearing, Boston prepared 
for the public outcry that would result if Burns were remanded to slavery. The 
U.S. Marshal warned the Mayor of Boston that “the whole military and police 
force of the city would be required to preserve the peace of the city and prevent 
riot and assaults upon the officers of the law in the discharge of their duty.”166 
Thousands of Bostonians gathered outside the courthouse, which was protected 
by a company of U.S. infantry armed with a cannon.167 The Mayor of Boston 
issued a proclamation warning the citizens of Boston that the police were 
“clothed with full discretionary powers to sustain the laws of the land” and 
asking the people “to leave those streets which it may be found necessary to 
clear temporarily.”168 When Burns was ordered back to Virginia, hundreds of 
soldiers, including cavalry and a horse drawn cannon, escorted him through a 
jeering mass of some 50,000 Bostonians who had emerged to protest the 
rendition.169 Black banners were hung from windows along the streets to mourn 
the death of liberty, and the crowd booed and harassed the military escort.170  
Although serious violence was averted, the rendition served as a public 
spectacle that rallied the citizens of Boston against slavery and the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850.171 One formerly conservative Bostonian wrote that, after the 
rendition, “I put my face in my hands and wept. I could do nothing less.”172 
Another Bostonian famously asserted: “We went to bed one night old-fashioned, 
conservative, compromise Union Whigs and waked up stark mad 
Abolitionists.” 173  Perhaps sensing the change in public opinion and the 
counterproductive nature of federal enforcement, Justice Curtis dismissed all 
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charges against those involved in the failed courthouse rescue based on a 
technicality. 174  As conservative political leader Edward Everett explained, 
because no Boston jury was likely to convict, “[t]he trial would only have 
afforded the defendants a new chance to insult the Court and defy the law.”175 
Further demonstrating the growing public distaste for enforcement, the Federal 
Commissioner who issued the certificate of removal for Burns, Edward G. 
Loring, was removed from office as a Massachusetts probate judge because of his 
role in the rendition.176 
The progression of cases in Boston demonstrates that, as federal authorities 
attempted to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, they met with increasing 
resistance, making the law costly and dangerous to enforce.177 Much of the 
increase in opposition to the Act was likely attributable to rising antislavery 
sentiment in the North, especially after the Kansas-Nebraska Act was 
introduced in 1854. 178  However, many Bostonians, including prominent 
antislavery leaders, believed that the increase in popular support was also due in 
part to the compelling drama of the cases themselves, which pitted sympathetic 
fugitives against unscrupulous slave catchers and a draconian federal law. 
Moreover, those who spoke out against rendition condemned not just the fact of 
slavery, but also the proslavery terms of the Act of 1850. Because most 
Bostonians would not support violation of the Constitution, antislavery leaders 
forcefully argued that the Act of 1850 was unconstitutional since it failed to 
respect traditional Northern legal principles like the trial by jury or habeas 
corpus that would have protected the interests of free blacks. These arguments 
no doubt helped to justify resistance in the eyes of many moderate and 
conservative Northerners. Many others who did not accept the legal arguments 
against the Act of 1850 were forced to confront the reality that liberty in the 
North was becoming inconsistent with a Union permitting slavery in the South. 
B. Enforcement in Wisconsin  
Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 had a similar effect in 
Wisconsin. On March 10, 1854, a Kentucky slave owner and three U.S. marshals 
arrested Joshua Glover as a fugitive slave outside of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.179 
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When Sherman Booth, an antislavery newspaper editor in Milwaukee, learned of 
the arrest, he published the following handbill: 
 Last night a colored man was arrested near Racine, on a warrant of 
Judge Miller, by Deputy-Sheriff Cotton, and making some resistance, 
was knocked down and brought to this City, and incarcerated in the 
County Jail. 
 Marshal Cotton denied knowing anything about it at 9 o'clock this 
morning. The object evidently is to get a secret trial, without giving him 
a chance to defend himself by counsel.  
 Citizens of Milwaukee! Shall we have Star Chamber proceedings 
here? and shall a Man be dragged back to Slavery from our Free Soil, 
without an open trial of his right to Liberty?180 
“That afternoon, Booth and his associates organized a mass meeting at the 
Court House Square in Milwaukee.”181 Booth helped gather the crowd by riding 
through the streets on horseback, “calling on all Free Citizens, who were not 
willing to be made slaves or slave-catchers.”182 At the meeting, the people 
pledged to “stand by this prisoner, and do [their] utmost to secure for him a fair 
and impartial Trial by Jury.”183 After a number of speeches were given on the 
unconstitutionality of the Act of 1850, Glover’s attorney told the crowd that the 
U.S. marshals, acting under the advice of a federal judge, refused to obey any 
writ of habeas corpus issued by a state court.184 Upon hearing this, members of 
the crowd broke down the door to the jail, rescued Glover, and helped him flee 
to Canada.185 
Soon thereafter, federal authorities arrested Booth for aiding and abetting 
Glover’s rescue in violation of the Act of 1850.186 Booth’s prosecution prompted 
an extended conflict between state and federal authorities. In perhaps the 
greatest success of antislavery constitutionalism, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
issued a writ of habeas corpus and released Booth from federal custody on the 
grounds that the Act of 1850 was unconstitutional.187 The Wisconsin Court held 
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the Act was unconstitutional because it denied the right to a trial by jury and 
gave judicial power to commissioners in violation of Article III.188 The U.S. 
District Court nevertheless proceeded with the trial, and the Milwaukee jury 
convicted Booth. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, again intervened and 
released Booth under a writ of habeas corpus.189 The case was not resolved until 
the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Ableman v. Booth, which upheld 
Booth’s conviction and the constitutionality of the Act of 1850.190 
The conflict between the state and federal courts in Booth’s case galvanized 
public opinion against slavery and enforcement of the Act of 1850 in Wisconsin. 
The State Journal, for example, explained: “We are sometimes told that the 
institution of slavery should be let alone . . . that its ‘agitation’ can do no good. 
But here it is rampant, aggressive, [and] at our very thresholds.”191 In his 
newspaper, Booth reported that “[t]here never was half the sympathy felt for us 
that there has been since this trial.”192 In fact, Booth’s attorney, Byron Paine, 
was elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and enforcement of the Act of 
1850 was a major campaign issue for the Republican Party in Wisconsin, which 
swept into power during the late 1850s.193 No doubt influenced by Booth’s case 
and the rulings of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin legislature even 
passed a resolution declaring the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ableman “an 
arbitrary act of power . . . and therefore without authority, void and of no 
force.”194 In sum, enforcement of the Act of 1850 in Wisconsin gave a voice to 
abolitionists like Sherman Booth and mobilized popular opposition to proslavery 
law.  
Glover’s rescue and the subsequent judicial conflict likely only occurred 
because of the proslavery terms of the Act of 1850. The people of Milwaukee did 
not oppose Glover’s rendition merely because they opposed slavery; instead, 
they gathered to see that he be treated fairly and receive a trial by jury before 
being returned to slavery.195 Rather than attempt to nullify the constitutional 
duty to return fugitive slaves, most Wisconsinites merely sought to moderate the 
draconian provisions of the Act of 1850.196 When the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
intervened and held that the Act of 1850 was unconstitutional, it was likely 
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motivated by the same desire to restore traditional legal protections like the trial 
by jury to presumptively free people claimed as fugitives.197 If the Act of 1850 
had given greater protections for the liberty interests of free blacks, the Booth 
case and resulting antislavery backlash likely would not have occurred. 
Conclusion  
Federal fugitive slave policy in the late antebellum era was blind to the fact 
that a slave owner’s right to recover a fugitive slave conflicted with the liberty 
rights of free blacks who might be falsely claimed as fugitives. Before the 
Supreme Court intervened, state law had limited the claimant’s right to recover 
fugitive slaves by providing legal protections for the competing rights of free 
blacks in the North. In Prigg, the Supreme Court held that any state effort to 
respect the liberty interest of free blacks was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with a slave owner’s constitutionally protected right of recaption. 
After losing the power to consider the liberty rights of free blacks, many 
Northerners, including state law enforcement officers and judges, lost interest in 
assisting in rendition. Without the assistance of state officials, Southerners found 
it difficult to recover their fugitive slaves. By effectively cutting the states out of 
the rendition process, Prigg undermined enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1793. 
Empowered by unique political circumstances in the Compromise of 1850, 
Southern extremists similarly designed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 to assist 
slave catchers, while providing minimal protections for the rights of free blacks. 
Enforcement in the North followed a predictable pattern. While most 
Northerners initially accepted the Act of 1850 as a necessary condition of Union, 
federal enforcement provoked an antislavery backlash that in turn made future 
enforcement increasingly difficult. Not only did the Act of 1850 bring slavery to 
the doorstep of Northerners in areas like Boston and Milwaukee, but, for many 
Northerners, enforcement was incompatible with the legal traditions of a free 
country. Just as Prigg gave Northerners a way to channel antislavery feeling into 
noncooperation, the proslavery content of the Act of 1850 legitimized 
interference with its enforcement. By insisting on uncompromisingly proslavery 
terms that did not account for the competing interests of free blacks, the federal 
fugitive slave regime created by Congress and the Supreme Court was self-
defeating. 
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